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in its history, after the death of its leader, president Josip Broz Tito. The reforms dur­
ing the 1970s brought decentralization and gave sizeable rights to Yugoslav republics, 
while the power was in the hands of League of Communists of Yugoslavia, consist­
ing of leagues of communists of republics. Social and economic system was organized 
through socialist self­management, whose aim was to involve the working class into 
the management of economy and social affairs. In the early 1980s there was a growing 
economic crisis in Yugoslavia, but nevertheless the system seemed stable, the main 
48* This paper was written within the scientific project War, Victims, Violence and Borders of Free­
dom in the Croatian 20th Century (IP-2019-04-6673) of the Croatian Institute for History, financed by the 
Croatian Science Foundation.
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exception being the riots of ethnic Albanians that broke up in the Serbian autonomous 
province Kosovo.1
Socialist Republic of Croatia, as one of Yugoslav republic, had its own appara­
tus of internal affairs and security and one of its elements was State Security Service 
(Služba državne sigurnost, SDS). Each Yugoslav republic had such a service and there 
was also a federal State Security. From 1980 to 1982 the State Security of Croatia gath­
ered various information concerning the events in the People’s Republic of Poland. 
From late 1980 State Security reports dealing with those events were marked under 
the codename “Action Cracow”. The main aim of this paper is to present the informa­
tion gathered by the State Security of Croatia concerning these Polish events.
The State Security used various methods to gather information. In Croatia it 
tapped telephone conversations and intercepted mail, and also used informants (“col­
laborators”, “social connections”). The State Security informants, mostly journalists 
or representatives of certain Croatian enterprises, also visited Poland and later submit­




and the regime. During that period there were also various personal changes in the 
Polish government and leadership of the ruling Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska 
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR), with general Wojciech Jaruzelski gaining all 
the main party and state positions. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw 
Treaty Organization (WTO) states were worried about the “counterrevolutionary” de­
velopments in Poland and their military intervention in Poland seemed a possibility. 
Ultimately, the crisis of the Polish communist regime was resolved by the declaration 
of the martial law on December 13, 1981 and a crackdown on “Solidarity”, which was 
banned.2
Yugoslav regime was eager to show its independence from the Eastern Block 
and to present its socialist self­management system as superior to the “state social­
ism” of WTO states. Yugoslav regime saw the events in Poland as a result of weak­
nesses of the Polish communist regime, while the perception of “Solidarity” was 
ambivalent, because it was seen as a movement including “moderate”, but also “radi­
cal” and therefore counterrevolutionary elements. Accordingly, Yugoslavia respected 
“Solidarity” in its demands for reforms, but it also condemned its anti­communist ele­
ments. Yugoslav regime saw the introduction of the martial law in Poland as its inter­
nal affair that should not be meddled in by other states.3
1  Z. Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945.–1991., od zajedništva do razlaza, Zagreb 2006, p. 489–
497.
2  A. Paczkowski, Pola stoljeća povijesti Poljske: 1939.–1989. godine, Zagreb 2001, p. 361–413.
3  M. Sokulski, Sytuacja w Polsce w latach 1978–1981 w dokumentach najwyższych władz jugosło­
wiańskich, [w:] Świat wobec Solidarności 1980–1989, eds. P. Jaworski, Ł. kamiński, Warszawa 2013, 
p. 185–207.
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POLISH GENERAL CONSULATE IN ZAGREB 
In late August 1980 Viktor kinecki, Polish ambassador in Belgrade, ordered kazimier 
Haladusz, Polish general consul  in Zagreb,  to stop  issuing visas  to  journalists who 
wanted to visit Poland, in fact to postpone all visits to Poland with the exception of 
those that are necessary.4
Also  in August Haladusz  and  his wife  commented  on  strikes  in  Szczecin  and 
Gdansk in a telephone conversation that was tapped by the State Security, concluding 




Polish state and Party leadership were a positive step, because those who were replaced 
played a negative role and were responsible for a widespread corruption. Rudnicki 
also said that Poland will now use the Yugoslav experience, meaning the self­manage­
ment. Also in September, consul for consular affairs kazimierz Bartłomiejczyk com­
mented that he does not believe that the new Polish leadership will be able to resolve 
the crisis, because Poland is in the state of “anarchy”. He also mentioned that there 
was concern that former prime minister Edward Babiuch would ask Moscow to inter­
vene in Poland, and also mentioned that Piotr Jaroszewicz, who was prime minister 
before Babiuch, was a “Soviet man”.6
In  late  1980  and  early  1981  there were  numerous  changes  in  the  Polish  gen­




ative role, but what is currently going on in Poland is a “counterrevolution”. The 





very nervous and worried about the situation in Poland, fearing violence and unrests. 
The staff of the General consulate also thought that Polish radio stations are not re­
4   Hrvatska, Hrvatski državni arhiv u Zagrebu  (hereafter: HR-HDA), Record group 1561, Služba 







porting the truth about the events, while Western radio stations were reporting about 
concentration on WTO troops on Polish borders.9
In early February 1981 kazimierz Janiak, formerly a high PZPR official in Płock, 
was appointed a new general  consul  in Zagreb.  In conversation with an  informant 
of the State Security Janiak said that the Polish government and Party are optimis­
tic about the improvement of the difficult economic situation which is especially visi­
ble in providing food for the population. The Polish leadership planned to cut unnec­
essary investments and to involve the working class in running of their companies. 
Janiak also mentioned that there exist “powerful forces” in Poland whose aim is to 
destabilize situation and they enjoy the support of the reactionary circles in the West. 
Janiak hoped that military intervention can be averted and that the government and 
Party will take a strong stand toward those spreading antisocialist propaganda and 
destabilizing the situation. The informer who spoke with Janiak later reported that 
Janiak had not once mentioned “Solidarity”.10
But Janiak did not stay in Zagreb for long. The Polish press published articles crit­
icizing Janiak’s service while he held positions in Poland and he was ordered to re­
turn home. All this put a great strain on Janiak and he tried to postpone his return.11 
In June 1981, Janiak contacted various consulates of the Western states and the State 
Security concluded that it is possible that he will defect to the West in order to avoid 
returning to Poland.12 Finally, in July 1981, Janiak returned to Poland and kazimierz 
Bartłomiejczyk became a new acting general consul in Zagreb.13
In  fact,  Polish  General  Consulate  in  Zagreb  was  officially  closed  on  July  31, 
1981. Nevertheless, Bartłomiejczyk  and  sparce  Polish  staff  remained  in Zagreb  in 
order to finish the remaining jobs and to transport the Consulate’s documentation to 




en to Poland “by force”, and also mentioned that Janiak was a close friend of the 
former Polish prime minister Jaroszewicz. Bartłomiejczyk also said that he had in­
formation that Polish government will soon introduce the “military regime” and the 
Polish army will take control over the economy and production which are currently in 
complete disarray. Bartłomiejczyk explained that the Polish government counts on the 









121STATE SECURITY OF SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND EVENTS IN POLAND...
in the Polish army. If an attempt to reinstate order by Polish government fails, there is 
an “agreement” to call for “brotherly assistance” of other socialist states.15
In  late  November  1981,  an  informant  of  the  State  Security  again  talked  with 
Bartłomiejczyk who said that he was finishing the affairs of the General Consulate, 
which is closed in accordance to the decision of the Polish Government to reduce 
the  expenses  of  its  diplomatic  network. Bartłomiejczyk,  as well  as  the Polish  am­
bassador in Belgrade, thought that such decision was a mistake. There were 19 var­
ious Polish missions in Belgrade, which was irrational, while the General Consulate 
in Zagreb was being closed despite the necessity for Poland to keep economic con­
tacts in Croatia and Slovenia and despite the fact that many Polish tourists were visit­
ing Croatian Adriatic seaside. Bartłomiejczyk also mentioned that the former general 
consul, Janiak, was in the meantime retired and his previous service, while he held of­
fices in Poland, was evaluated in a negative light.16
Concerning the current situation in Poland, Bartłomiejczyk commented that PZRP 
is in constant “defensive” because many of its members compromised themselves 
and lost the reputation. Bartłomiejczyk thought that the former PZRP first secretary 






mentioned that “old communists” who support the Polish government are in grave 
danger from “Solidarity” and other enemies. Therefore, the government decided to di­
vide weapons among its loyalists and Bartłomiejczyk was also planning to get himself 
a pistol. Bartłomiejczyk also said that Wałęsa spoke about “Solidarity” taking over the 
power by the year’s end with himself becoming the new Polish prime minister.18
On December  11,  1981  an  informant  spoke with Bartłomiejczyk’s wife Anna, 
who said that the dialogue between the Polish government and “Solidarity” was fin­
ished and Wałęsa would soon be arrested. She also said that during the negotiations 
with the “Solidarity”, the government used media to show the destructive and nega­
tive background of “Solidarity” and this propaganda was partially successful. Anna 
Bartłomiejczyk thought general Jaruzelski had “limited” political capabilities and will 
rule with “iron hand”, but she spoke in the most positive terms about the Polish army, 








After  the martial  law was  declared, kazimierz Bartłomiejczyk,  in  a  telephone 
conversation with a consulate clerk, commented that general Jaruzelski “spoke well” 
in his public proclamation of the martial law. Bartłomiejczyk thought that the mar­
tial law was unavoidable and it was necessary to arrest “hooligans” from “Solidarity”, 
“Trotskyists” and “troublemakers”. But he also mentioned that Wałęsa was a “peace­
ful Catholic” who struggles for “Polish blood”.20
Polish General Consulate in Zagreb was officially closed, but after the proclama­
tion of the martial law its staff became more active, as many Polish citizens contact­
ed it. These Poles were mostly interested in how they could return back to Poland. 
Bartłomiejczyk was explaining to them that they could use train lines via Hungary and 






them that “anarchy” in Poland had to be ended, so everything is “good” because peo­
ple returned to work and the situation would improve. Order in the state had to be re­
stored and some people had to be arrested.22
The State Security also gained information that immediately before the proclama­
tion of state of war in Poland and after it several hundred Polish citizens who found 
themselves in Yugoslavia applied to Austrian General Consulate in Zagreb for visas. 
These Poles then travelled from Yugoslavia to Austria where authorities accommodat­
ed them in a camp, from where they could leave for Australia and Canada.23
In early January 1982. Polish ambassador kinecki contacted Bartłomiejczyk. The 
ambassador received information from Warsaw that Yugoslav authorities established 
a camp for Poles who refuse to return home, located near Varaždin in north-western 
Croatia. Bartłomiejczyk travelled to Varaždin where local police informed him that 
the camp for Poles did not exist. In fact, a group of Polish tourist were, without per­
mission, camping for a month near the Hungarian border, but in the meantime they 
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It seems that kazimierz Bartłomiejczyk finally returned to Poland in early June 
1982. Just before the departure, his wife Anna told a State Security informant that situ­
ation in Poland was still “catastrophic” because Polish government was not able to re­
solve the problem of “counterrevolution”. Soviet intervention was “expected” because 






Poland and hoped they would be sent to some of the Polish consulates in USA.26
Nevertheless,  in early July 1982 Zbigniew Gurzinsky,  the first  secretary of  the 
Polish Embassy in Belgrade, visited the Diet of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. He 
explained that Poland had to close a number of its missions in various states because 
of its political and economic problems. Despite this, due to the exceptionally friendly 
attitude of the authorities of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, the Polish side decid­
ed to make an exception and to reopen its General Consulate in Zagreb.27 In October 
1982 Stefan kubiak arrived  to Zagreb as newly appointed charge d’affaires of  the 
Polish General Consulate. Concerning the current situation in Poland he commented 
that it was gradually improving, there were no more demonstrations, while new law 
on trade unions were much more democratic and the new law was written based on 
the experiences of Belgian, French and Yugoslav trade unions. Kubiak also mentioned 
that new harvest in Poland would be plentiful which would further help to improve the 
situation and increase productivity.28
INFORMATION GATHERED IN POLAND AND FROM POLISH CITIZENS
In early September 1980, the informants of the State Security visited Poland and spo­
ke with Waldemar Boldaniuk, general director of the Polish oil industry. Boldaniuk 
stated that Polish foreign debt amounts to 20 billion USD, but the Poles managed to 
postpone the payments of foreign credits for the period of five years and they also re­
ceived favourable loans from France, Italy, Sweden and USA. Boldaniuk also stated 
that the Polish army would oppose possible military intervention of the Soviet Union 








and, ultimately, Gierek was forced to resign although, publicly, he withdrew becau­
se of ill health.29
In late September 1980, a Polish delegation visited INA oil company in Zagreb. 
The delegation included Jacek Suszyński, general secretary of the Polish Organization 
of Engineers  and Technicians, Wojciech Biedrzycki, professor  at  the University of 
krakow and  Josef Rasakovcki, director of  the  Institute  for Oil  and Gas Mining  in 
Krakow. These Polish representatives talked about the situation in their state, claim­
ing that it is even more difficult than it had been during the period of numerous strikes. 
Media from Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic were attacking the sit­
uation in Poland while simultaneously representatives of these two states were of­
fering material assistance to Poland. Rasakovcki also mentioned that government 
insists that “Solidarity” should be registered with the charter that recognizes the prin­
ciples of alliance with the Soviet Union and Polish membership within the WTO. 
The “Solidarity” leadership rejected such principles and this led to disagreement with 
the state. The Polish guests also mentioned that Soviet troops that took part in the 
maneuvers in German Democratic Republic are now stationed in northern Poland, 
while Czechoslovakia stationed its parachute units in its border area with Poland. 
Rasakovcki explained that Polish army was in a state of readiness during the strikes 
and was ready to oppose foreign intervention, but in the meantime became completely 
isolated from all the developments in Poland and, allegedly, even did not have access 
to live ammunition. The Polish visitors concluded that Polish people and its working 
class were under pressure to abandon any demands for political changes.30
In early November 1980, a journalist A. L., informant of State Security, visited 
Poland and conducted an interview with Polish foreign minister Józef Czyrek. After 
the official interview Czyrek told the journalist that he was worried about the Ronald 
Reagan’s victory at the American presidential elections. Czyrek thought that Reagan 
would revise the policy of previous Carter administration on supply of Poland with 
the agricultural products. Reagan administration would also make both political and 
economic pressure on Poland, but the economic pressure would be much more diffi­
cult to withstand. The departure of Carter administration also meant the departure of 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was Carter’s National Security Advisor. Czyrek thought 
that Brzezinski, although an anti­communist, cared about the interests of Poland. But 
Czyrek mentioned that there were 10 million Poles living in the USA, and he hoped 
they would influence Reagan in order to prevent “famine” in Poland. According to 
Czyrek, situation with agriculture and food supplies in Poland was “tragic”. Czyrek 
blamed the PZPR for hiding the real situation from the workers. As a consequence, 
workers lost their faith in the Party. Czyrek was also worried about the elements with­
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A. L. talked with Tomasz Ritel from “Interpress” agency which said Lech Wałęsa 
was a “Christian socialist”, naïve and lacking experience and political knowledge. 
Nevertheless, Polish workers had a mystical faith in him and saw “Solidarity” as 
an answer to all problems. Ritel considered that in coalmining regions, around 75% 
members of  “Solidarity” were  also members of PZPR, while  in  the  coastal  region 
only  around  50%  “Solidarity” members were  communists, which  led  to  disagree­
ments within the “Solidarity”. Ritel also explained that “Solidarity” was an indige­
nous and independent movement, despite the claims of the Polish state propaganda 
that it was under the influence from the West. In case of the Soviet military interven­
tion, Ritel thought that Poles would be able to put up only passive resistance and add­
ed that Soviets were most worried about the current shifts within the PZPR aimed at 
the democratization within the Party.32
A. L. also made the official  interview with Stefan Bratkowski, president of  the 






leadership, “Solidarity”, Catholic intelligentsia and other groups were all interested in 
finding a solution which would lead to stability. Therefore, Bratkowski was optimis­
tic and thought that Poland stood before the development of self­management, and 
cooperation between the authorities and the people would lead to economic recovery. 
Bratkowski also thought that “Solidarity” would play a great role in the normaliza­
tion, because they were a strong group of people of “good will”. Anyway, two thirds 
of “Solidarity” members were also members of PZPR, so “Solidarity” could not be 
perceived as something aimed against the system.33
A State Security informant visited the Tobacco Institute in Cracow in December 
1980,  where  he  talked  with  its  representatives,  Vladislav  Pelko  and  Leopold 
kowalchuk. They told him that “Solidarity” was trying to replace certain officials in 
their institute. They also complained about shortages of food, explaining that Poland 
was exporting meat in order to pay its foreign debts, leading to shortages. They said 
that counterrevolutionary groups from Polish emigre circles infiltrated the “Solidarity” 
and also blamed Pope John Paul II for the current crisis in Poland, although he had 
in the meantime changed his attitude and was appealing for the “joint salvation” of 
Poland. kowalchuk also mentioned  the Polish  army,  saying  that  all  younger offic­
ers supported the democratic reforms and the “Solidarity”, while older officers were 
mostly inclined toward the Soviet Union. Kowalchuk was also worried about the pos­





tion of other WTO states (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic) 
and mentioned that, allegedly, a large number of Polish army uniforms were sent to 
Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, so he did not rule out the possibility that troops 
of these states, dressed in Polish uniforms, could be deployed in Poland.34
In June 1981 Leopold kowalchuk, while on business trip to Trieste in Italy, again 
contacted the informant of State Security and mentioned that recently a Soviet consul 
in Poznań was killed, but this event was not made public. kowalchuk suspected that 
the Soviets themselves were behind the killing in order to use it as a pretext for pres­
sure on Poland.35
During February 1981 journalist A. L. visited Poland again. He again contacted 
Tomasz Ritel from “Interpress” who told him that situation was constantly deteriorat­
ing. In the meantime, general Jaruzelski became the prime minister, and Ritel com­
mented that previous prime minister Pinkovski did not enjoy any respect among the 
population. Ritel thought that Jaruzelski would have stronger influence on Poles who 
traditionally respect the army. Also, Jaruzelski was well known as a modest person 
which was of great importance in relation with the current campaign against the cor­
ruption of former officials.
Ritel also commented that the role of the Polish army was still unclear, but it was 
believed that the army would intervene in order to prevent the possible Soviet inva­
sion. The position of the Catholic church was growing stronger but simultaneously 
the Church was calming the radical elements within “Solidarity” and, in certain cases, 
the Church cooperated with the regime. Within “Solidarity” itself, its local representa­
tives were less and less ready to obey its central leadership and Wałęsa. Local branch­





manding from local “Solidarity” to give up on this demand, but they refused and the 
resort was temporarily turned into hospital. Some local branches of “Solidarity” were 
also questioning the position of Wałęsa. The national congress of “Solidarity” had not 
been held at that time, so its leadership, along with Wałęsa, were not officially elect­
ed. In fact, western governments and the Pope were pressuring “Solidarity” not to be 
radical, in order to avoid the possible Soviet intervention. The “Solidarity” leadership 
agreed to this, but because of the moderation it was losing the support of the mass­
es. Concerning the PZRP Ritel concluded that it lost the authority not only among the 
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ing large scale reforms in the management of the economy with the introduction of 
self­management on a scale “wider” than the Yugoslav. But “Solidarity” was sceptical 








Nevertheless, Boldaniuk concluded that all the changes in Poland were aimed at the 
development of the socialist system. He claimed that both kania and Jaruzelski in fact 
supported “Solidarity” and were in agreement with its demand for an economic re­
form based on socialist principles. Yugoslavia with its socialist self­management sys­
tem should serve as an example to Polish reforms. State Security noted that all mem­
bers of the Polish delegation, and especially Boldaniuk, showed particular interests 
in the Yugoslav experience with self­management because they were also planning 
to adopt it. Jakub Siemek, head of the Oil and Gas Institute, who was also a member 
of the visiting delegation, stated that “Solidarity” has 11 million members which was 
a guarantee that Poland would withstand any Soviet pressure. Soviets would not dare 
to intervene militarily, while Wałęsa gathered around him a group of outstanding ex­
perts in economy, politics and science.37
In late April 1981 Wadim Mietkowski, head of the Polish pavilion at Zagreb Fair, 
visited Zagreb. Concerning the situation  in Poland he said  that Soviets did not un­
derstand the essence of “Solidarity” whose strength was impressive, because it could 
force  the ministers and voivodes  to  resign. Mietkowski explained  that “Solidarity” 
had importance to the Polish people equal to the importance of the October 
Revolution for Russians, because they saw “liberation and complete independence” 
in “Solidarity”.38
During  late  November  1981  a  State  Security  social  connection  H. M.  visited 
Poland. After returning to Zagreb he reported that Poles see the exit from the current 











Another State Security informant returned from a business trip to Poland in late 
December 1981, briefly after  the proclamation of  the martial  law. He reported  that 
Polish business partners he contacted commented that Poles themselves were to blame 
for a huge national crisis. Poles preferred easy life over hard work, while at the same 
time they had a strong anti­Soviet attitude. They preferred going on strike because 
they did not want to work and see their products being exported to the Soviet Union. 
The current crisis stared around 1970 when strikes were organized in larger industri­
al centres. In 1976 situation again deteriorated and at that time various, mostly “re­
actionary” organizations were organized, such as the Workers’ Defence Committee 
(Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR). The following step in the crisis was the founda­
tion of “Solidarity”, whose advisors came from KOR, while its ideological patron was 
the Catholic church. The “Solidarity” wanted the crisis, because this would enable it 
to gain power. But the regime itself also preferred the crisis because it could blame the 
“Solidarity” for paralyzing the state and ultimately opening the possibility to crush the 
most exposed enemies of the regime.40
The same Polish sources also claimed that prior to the introduction of the mar­
tial law, “Solidarity” caused numerous incidents. One of them occurred in a factory 
near Warsaw where “Solidarity” demanded from all PZRP members to renounce their 
membership in the Party, or to quit their jobs. There were also rumours that there are 
foreigners within “Solidarity”, among them Americans, and after the proclamation of 
the martial law it was been publicly reported that police arrested one of those foreign­
ers during the curbing of the strike in the Gdansk shipyard. The police also discovered 
secret “Solidarity” stashes of weapons and explosive. Both foreigners and weapons 
were smuggled by ships carrying aid for Poland and some of the ships were offloaded 
exclusively by selected members of “Solidarity”. They also told the State Security in­
formant that general Jaruzelski was a patriot who in 1970, as a commander of Gdansk 
military district, refused to use his units against the workers’ demonstrations. During 
1981 Jaruzelski again refused to use army to stop the strikes, claiming that army’s role 
was to defend the state and not to combat Polish workers.41
It seems that during 1982 informants of State Security rarely travelled to Poland, 
so reports on situation from that period are not available.




stated  that he  left Poland  in March 1981, because of his opposition  to  the govern­
ment, and was living in Paris at the time and worked as a journalist for a “Solidarity” 
paper. In Paris he could propagate the ideas of “Solidarity”, which was impossible 
in Poland. Nevertheless, he stated that he would return to Poland after the victory of 
40   HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 14.01.1982, Informacija broj 34.
41   HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 14.01.1982, Informacija broj 34.
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“Solidarity”. Questioned why he carried “Solidarity” bulletins to Yugoslavia, he an­
swered that there was a „freedom of opinion” in Yugoslavia and that the representa­
tives of Yugoslav trade unions attended the congress of “Solidarity”, so he did not see 
the reason why the bulletins should not be taken to Yugoslavia. He said that he arrived 
to Zagreb to meet with his father, because he could not meet him anywhere else. He 
indeed met with the father at the airport, and the State Security reported that the meet­
ing was “very touching”, as both cried, hugged and kissed. Andrzej gave Wadim med­
icines and some presents. After the interrogation Andrzej Mietkowski was informed 
that he would have to immediately leave Yugoslavia. As the State Security reported, 
he did not take this lightly and he asked if he could stay for a few days. His father also 
asked for his son to stay and he wanted to intervene via his colleagues in the Chamber 
of commerce of Croatia and the Diet of Socialist Republic of Croatia. Despite all this, 
Andrzej Mietkowski flew away on that same day. He was also prohibited from en­
tering Yugoslavia for the following two years. “Solidarity” bulletins and a book of 
a Russian author discovered during the custom control were seized and Mietkowski 







consolidating the situation in Poland and the Polish position within the Eastern Block. 
Nevertheless, PZPR was still “decimated” and would only gradually regain strength. 
Although the situation appeared calm, “clerical­fascist terror” of “Solidarity” was still 




State Security also gained information on situation in Poland by observing and con­













change in Poland, because it was encircled by other socialist states. Nevertheless, 
he did not rule out the possibility of Soviet intervention if the situation in Poland 
had turned into “anarchy”, adding that Poles were “smugglers and lazy people”, who 
through history had been unable to recognize who their “true friends” were.45
In June 1981 Eduard krasavin, Soviet general consul in Zagreb, commented that 
the Soviet military intervention in Poland was not an option. He also said he expect­
ed substantial changes in the Soviet foreign policy in the future, because its interven­
tion  in Afghanistan was  unnecessary, while Moscow’s  support  for  certain  govern­
ments and progressive movements in Africa was costly and sometimes only brought 
problems to Moscow.46
Also in early June 1981 an informant of State Security of Croatia visited Belgrade, 
where he spoke with a Soviet representative, who said that the Soviets would intervene 
in Poland only in the case of civil war in that country, but otherwise there would be no 




Press Agency, who bitterly commented events in Poland. Antonov was pessimistic 
about the Polish ability to resolve the crisis, although he thought that Jaruzelski as 
prime minister was a person who could be trusted. Antonov mentioned that Poles 
were visiting Western European states where they claimed that they would like Poland 
to have the western standard of living. But in order to achieve such standard, com­
mented Antonov, the Poles should work and not strike. One of Antonov’s assistants 




they would like their state to be similar to Yugoslavia, meaning that they would like 
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Belgrade, during his visit to Zagreb, critically commented the Yugoslav anti-Soviet at­
titude. He was especially dissatisfied with the Yugoslav press covering of the situation 
in Poland. According to him, Yugoslav press had great sympathies for “Solidarity”, 
but he asked his hosts what would be the reaction if something similar to “Solidarity” 
appeared in Yugoslavia.50
During September 1981  the State Security also gained  information from a  lec­
turer of the Serbo­Croatian language who was at that time working at the Leningrad 
University. Among others, the lecturer noticed that all lecturers of foreign languages 
receive equal treatment, with the exception of the lecturer from Bulgaria who enjoyed 
a privileged position, while the lecturer of Polish language had the worst accommoda­
tions and the lowest salary.51 The same source later reported that in November 1981 
four professors of Polish language at the Leningrad University were mobilized to the 
Soviet army, which was seen as a sign that the crisis in Poland was escalating and the 
Soviets were preparing to intervene.52
In the meantime, in October 1981, a State Security informant spoke with Vitaliy 
Dudnichenko, Soviet consul in Zagreb, who said that there would be large scale chang­
es in the Polish leadership, because American intelligence services, with the help of 
the Catholic clergy, played an important role in Poland. The Soviet consul added that 
the role of CIA in events in Poland is known and some of CIA’s agents have been ar­
rested by Polish security services. Despite all this, Dudnichenko concluded that due 
to various reasons “force” cannot be applied in Poland.53
On December 11, 1981, a State Security informant “Jan” spoke with Soviet con­
sul Dudnichenko, who commented that break in the dialogue between the Polish 
Government and the “Solidarity” was unavoidable. Dudnichenko thought that 
Jaruzelski was “well organized” and would eventually be successful. Dudnichenko 





















intervention in Poland, therefore after the proclamation of the martial law Soviet cit­
izens were “relieved” and for that reasons there was no wider disapproval of the ma­
terial aid the Soviets were currently sending to Poland. “Franjo” assumed that amount 




won” and the current Polish leadership would be able to resolve the crisis. Concerning 
the Polish debts to Western countries, their obligations were divided among the WTO 
states, in order to show “solidarity” with Poland, and this was done according to the 
“wise recommendation” of the Soviet leader Brezhnev.57
Along with the information on the situation in Poland collected from various 
Soviet representatives, the State Security also gained information about the views of 
the representatives of other WTO states.
In early September 1980 Günther Berg, general consul of the German Democratic 
Republic  in  Zagreb,  said  to  a  State  Security  informant  that  although  strikes  in 
Poland stopped, the problems were not resolved. Such a situation made the German 
Democratic Republic “gravely concerned”.58  In  July  1981  warships  of  German 
Democratic Republic visited the coastal town of Split. The east Germans were pessi­






of the Soviet Union, Tichy concluded that the speech was created under the Soviet 
“dictate” in order to, if necessary, open the possibility of the Soviet military interven­
tion in Poland. Tichy said that the Polish prime minister Jaruzelski talked with Wałęsa 
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and only stern measures would allow the Poles to avoid a catastrophe. The Poles were 
currently “starving”, which would not have been the case if they had had showed 
more loyalty toward the Soviet Union and WTO.61 In November 1981 Tichy said to 
an informant of the State Security that general Jaruzelski had taken over all the most 
informant positions of power in order to be able to act energetically. Tichy thought 
that the crisis in Poland reached the climax and because of this it was not surprising 
that the Soviet and Czechoslovak armies were ready to intervene. After the informant 
asked him whether this was not reminiscent of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
Tichy cynically responded: “Why would Poles have it any better than us!?”.62
Immediately  after  the proclamation of martial  law  in Poland, Miroslav Holub, 
the Czechoslovakian general consul in Zagreb, telephoned his wife on December 14, 
1981. She was a journalist in the “Rudé pravo” newspaper in Prague. They comment­
ed on the situation in Poland and concluded that the introduction of martial law on 
Sunday was a good move, but it remained to be seen how would workers react to the 
martial law after they return to work. Holub’s wife feared the possibility of the civil 
war in Poland, but her husband thought that unlikely, because he believed in the au­
thority the Polish army enjoyed among Poles. Holub also commented on the president 
Reagan’s statement on Poland, saying that the American president is a “cowboy” who 
acts as if Poland was an “American colony”.63
In early March 1982 vice-consul Tichy commented that the imposition of the mar­
tial law in Poland was the only possible solution that prevented the general chaos. 
Despite the negative reactions from parts of international community, headed by the 
United States, martial law in Poland, despite its sternness, was the only possible solu­
tion.64 In late summer of 1982 Tichy stated that “Solidarity” has been connected with 
foreign states. Those who participated in “Solidarity” and their families received ma­
terial assistance from abroad. He thought that it would take a long time to resolve the 
crisis, adding that similar events were also possible in Czechoslovakia, because of the 
lowering living standard of its working class.65
Through its informants the State Security also gained certain information about the 
Bulgarian viewpoint on the situation in Poland. During November 1980 an informant 
visited Bulgaria, where one of its officials stated that Bulgarians were indeed scared 
about the antisocialist developments in Poland. Bulgarians also commented that the 
Soviets hoped that the Poles themselves would resolve the crisis, possibly with the 
intervention of the Polish army, because the Soviets were aware that their interven­










Church and Western states stood behind the upheaval in Poland. These Bulgarian 
communists thought that introduction of self­management system in Poland was un­
realistic, while the introduction of the state of war was the only solution.67
Unlike the Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian representatives, their Romanian coun­
terparts were more  reserved.  In December 1980 Nicolae Ficiu,  the Romanian gen­
eral consul in Zagreb, stated that the Soviet Union would not and cannot intervene 
militarily in Poland, because this would have huge political consequences for both 
Moscow and WTO. Therefore, the Romanian standpoint on Poland was identical to 
the Yugoslav one — the Poles themselves had to resolve their problems, but — as 
Ficiu remarked — the Poles should clear their state from “American agents”.68
REACTIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV OPPOSITION
Because of its multinational composition, Yugoslavia did not have a unified opposi­
tion to the ruling regime. Yugoslav federative system recognized national rights of 
all its national and ethnic groups, but at the same time the nationalism of any na­
tion or ethnic groups was seen as dangerous and counterrevolutionary, aimed aga­




ning “the original” communist idea for pragmatic purposes of holding the power. The 
Yugoslav regime labelled such a type of opposition as “anarchist­liberals”.69 The re­
ports of the State Security of Croatia suggested that the “anarchist­liberal” circles sho­
wed the greatest activity concerning the proclamation of state of war in Poland.70
On  December  14,  1981  the  strike  committee  of  the  Szczecin  shipyard  issued 
a proclamation to the international community, asking them to demand from the 
Polish government to abolish the state of war, to release all arrested persons and to re­
instate all workers’ and democratic rights achieved since August 1980. Upon receiv­
ing this proclamation, a group of around 300 intellectuals, students and other citizens 
from Belgrade sent a petition to general Jaruzelski, proclaiming their support for the 
“Solidarity”, demanding the abolishment of the martial law and the liberation of polit­
67   HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 26.04.1982, Informacija broj 485.
68   HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 18.12.1980, Informacija broj 825.
69   k. Spehnjak, T. Cipek, Disidenti, opozicija i otpor — Hrvatska i Jugoslavija 1945.–1990., “Časo-
pis za suvremenu povijest 2007, no. 2, p. 255–297.
70   Yugoslav reactions to events in Poland during the early 1980s and to the “Solidarity” movement 
have recently been presented  in: M. Sokulski, Reakcje społeczeństwa jugosłowiańskiego na powstanie 
i rozwój Solidarności 1980–1981, “Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, Pismo naukowe poświęcone historii naj­
nowszej” 2020, no. 1, p. 226–251.
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ical prisoners. In their petition they accused Jaruzelski of playing an “infamous role” 
by adding the military putsch to the arsenal of the “bureaucratic counterrevolution”, 
which shows that Polish “bureaucracy” is no worse than the “most militant bourgeois 
reaction”.71
On December 24, 1981 a group of  around 20 persons gathered  in  front of  the 
Polish Embassy in Belgrade to protest the declaration of the state of war. The demon­
strations were not authorized by the authorities and were immediately dispersed by 
the police. The police in Belgrade then arrested some persons and began investigating 
who organized the sending of the petition to Jaruzelski. The authorities made clear to 
those involved in the protest against the martial law in Poland that the Yugoslav gov­
ernment issued its official view concerning these events after which any manifestation 
of the Yugoslav citizens in connection to the Polish events would not be tolerated.72
Already on December 30, 1981 the State Security in Zagreb had information that 
certain students of the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb, well known for their previous 









and under the measures of the State Security because of their “anarchistic­liberal” ac­
tivities. But the letter was also signed by several persons who were known to the State 
Security as Croatian nationalists. The State Security planned to interrogate some of 
the signatories of the letter of support, while it decided to put two students, known as 
“anarchistic­liberal”, who initiated the signing of the letter, under its “preliminary op­
erational analysis”.73
In  the meantime,  on December  13,  1981.,  Stjepan Udović,  a Yugoslav  citizen 












nal, taking into consideration that the Yugoslav authorities were not inclined to give 





would deal with questions of democracy in socialism and self­management.74
On January 14, 1982, a  lecture on events  in Poland was held at  the Faculty of 
Philosophy in Zagreb. The lecture was organized by the League of Socialist Youth 
chapter of the Faculty. The State Security carefully noted everything that was said at 
the lecture that was attended by around 250 persons, mostly students. The first lectur­
er was Žarko Puhovski, professor of philosophy. He stated that the Polish “Solidarity” 
was based on the right­wing bourgeois­liberal and nationalistic ideology, but even 
such an ideology could be “progressive” and “left-wing” in a modified Stalinist sys­
tem existing in Poland. Other lecturers, Vladimir Lay and Zdravko Malić, based on 
their own knowledge of Poland, gave insight into the current events, but were, espe­
cially Malić, more reluctant  to give any statements beyond  the official view of  the 
Yugoslav government.75
On  February  13,  1982,  a  session  of  a  study  group  “Man  and  System”  was 
held at the Faculty of Philosophy. This study group gathered persons from around 
Yugoslavia known for their “anarchistic­liberal” tendencies. The topic of the men­
tioned session was  the situation  in Poland and  it gathered around 35 persons  from 
Belgrade, Slovenian capital of Ljubljana, and Zagreb. Andrzej kutyłowski, an associ­
ate of the Institute for Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 
who left Poland in December 1981 and moved to Norway, also attended the session. 
According to the State Security, kutyłowski held a brief presentation in favour of the 
“Solidarity”, but without any analysis or theoretical background. After that, presenta­
tions were held by Yugoslavs. Among them, an economist Branko Horvat described 
the situation in Poland as a “the first revolution in socialist states”, claiming that the 
“Solidarity” would make the democratization process possible, while self­manage­
ment would play an important role. The State Security paid particular attention to the 
lecture of Mihajlo Marković, a professor from Belgrade. Marković thought that the 
events in Poland presented the most important attempt to counter the Stalinist mod­
el. He described the “Solidarity” as an autonomous and spontaneous mass movement. 
He also claimed that the Catholic church, despite its influence, did not play a crucial 
role within the “Solidarity”. Therefore, the experience of “Solidarity” showed that the 
working class could be the main subject of a revolutionary change and it could or­
ganize a truly democratic and pluralist movement. This movement was successful in 
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an oppositional political movement, and the movement was also successful in achiev­
ing self­management in enterprises. But an attempt to take part in the Polish govern­
ment was ultimately unsuccessful. Marković thought that the “Solidarity” could have 
been successful in taking part in the government, had it started a general strike in the 
spring of 1981, when the regime was weak. Ultimately the “Solidarity” was defeat­




able, although the events showed that an independent democratic movement could 
not achieve more than to participate in the government along with the “political bu­
reaucracy”. Marković also warned that  the Catholic church’s advices in the critical 
moments must be ignored, because they were incompatible with “the democratic so­
cialism”. Marković also concluded that the “Solidarity”, as it had existed before the 
martial law was “dead” but this was not caused primarily by the state terror, but be­
cause its 10 million members were not able to organize a general strike as an answer to 
the arrests of the “Solidarity” leaders. Nevertheless, Marković thought that the Polish 
people would probably continue its struggle and after several years a new and im­
proved movement similar to the “Solidarity” would reappear.76
Day before, on February 12, 1982, Andrzej kutyłowski also held a lecture at the 








ical demands of the “Solidarity”. In fact, the political demands were formulated only 
briefly before the imposition of the martial law, which was the only way to change the 
“structure of government”. He also said that the plans for the martial law were pre­
pared much before the “Solidarity” formulated its political demands so they were not 
the cause for the introduction of the martial law.77
The State Security was also observing the reactions of the Catholic Church in 
Croatia to the events in Poland. The communist regime in Croatia always paid great 
attention to the Catholic Church, seeing it as a rival in control of the masses and also 
as a religious organization connected with Croatian nationalism.78 After the procla­
mation of the martial law in Poland, State Security agents attending masses in the 
76   HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 17.02.1982, Informacija broj 198.
77   HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 19.02.1982, Informacija broj 214.




mons would mention the events in Poland and make political comments, but nothing 
of particular interest was noted.79
In early 1982 the State Security noted that the “Caritas” of the Zagreb Archdiocese 
was  sending  financial  aid  and  parcels  with  food  to  Poland.  In  March  1982  the 
Archbishop Józef Glemp sent a letter to Zagreb “Caritas”, thanking it for sending aid 
to Poland. The Zagreb “Caritas” also received numerous letters from Poland, asking 
for aid in money and food, as well as numerous letters thanking for received aid.80
From late May to mid-July of 1982 the Zagreb “Caritas” sent around 350 letters 
to Poland. All letters had the identical content, informing “Polish friends” that a par­
cel with food had been sent to them. Zagreb “Caritas” hoped that the parcels would be 
received intact and the “Polish friends” were asked to send a letter confirming its ar­
rival and also to send the addresses of other Polish families who needed help, so that 
the parcels could also be send to them. These parcels contained noodles, rice, choc­
olate, candy, “Vegeta” spice, instant soups, puddings, vitamin C, powdered milk and 
detergent. The Zagreb “Caritas” also received 519 letters from Poland, many of them 
written in German, thanking for the received aid. In some of these letters there were 
the addresses of other families in need of help, as well as requests for medicines and 
second hand clothes. The State Security obviously wanted to stop the activities of the 
Zagreb “Caritas”, therefore all the mentioned letters, to and from Poland, were not de­
livered to the intended addresses.81
CONCLUDING REMARkS
As seen from the sources presented in this paper, the State Security of the Socialist 
Republic of Croatia gathered a sizeable amount of information concerning the events 
in Poland leading to the proclamation of the martial law in the late 1981. Obviously, 
the State Security was not the only and possibly not even the most important source 
of information for the Yugoslav authorities about these events, because the Yugoslav 
diplomatic representatives in Poland certainly sent even more detailed reports to 
Belgrade.
What is unknown is how the State Security used the gathered information, wheth­
er they were analysed or sent for further use to other institutions, such as the League 
of Communists of Croatia or other authorities. Undoubtedly certain information gath­
ered by the State Security of Croatia about the events in Poland could nowadays, 
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based on rumours and individual opinions. Nevertheless, I consider these pieces of in­




Polish General consulate. The State Security was also particularly interested in reac­
tions of oppositional circles toward the events in Poland. According to its information, 
the most visible immediate response came from the so­called “anarchistic­liberal” cir­
cles, meaning the left­wing critical of the bureaucratic and non­democratic tendencies 
of the Yugoslav system. These circles were sympathetic toward “Solidarity”, seeing it 
as a genuine progressive movement of the Polish working class, or at least as a “right 
wing” movement that is nevertheless “positive” in the environment of the “modified 
Stalinist system” existing in Poland.
It is also interesting to note that the State Security reports sometimes mentioned 
various views and statements concerning the possibility of introducing a sort of self­
management in Poland, as a solution to its problems. This detail was obviously inter­
esting to the Yugoslavs, whose system was based on the socialist self­management.
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